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Re: Citation of supplemental authority - State v. Montoya, 960227-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch, 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(1), the State submits the following supplemental 
citations of authority: 
Mincey v. Arizona. 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, and 2413 n.6 and n.7 (1978) 
Wayne v. United States. 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied. 84 
S.Ct. 125 (1963) 
United States v. Borchardt. 809 F.2d 1115, 1117-1118 (5th Cir. 1987) 
People v. Stevenson. 51 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1239-1240, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 
878, 881 (Dec. 23, 1996) 
160 EAST 300 S O U T H - 6 T H FLOOR • P.O. Box 140854-0854 • SALT LAKE C ITY , UT 84114-0854 • T E L : 8 0 1 - 3 6 6 - 0 1 8 0 • FAX 801 -366 -0167 
Undersigned counsel was not on the brief and filed his notice of appearance in 
this case February 18, 1997. The above citations were discovered during his 
preparation for oral argument. They are relevant to Points I.C. and II. of the State's 
brief. A copy of People v. Stevenson is attached. 
Sincerely, 
'BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Joan C. Watt 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc. 
424 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attachment: People v. Stevenson 
59 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 
96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9405, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 
(Cite as: 51 Cal.App.4th 1234, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 878) 
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Jeffrey Andre STEVENSON, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. B097213. 
Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 4. 
Dec. 23, 1996. 
Certified for Partial Publication [FN*] 
FN* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 
976(b) and 976.1, this opinion is certified for 
publication with the exception of parts n, HI, IV, 
and V. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Los 
Angeles County, No. YA024396, Douglas A. 
McKee, J., of possession of controlled substance. 
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, Baron, 
J., held that rescue doctrine exception to Miranda 
requirements applied to arrested suspect's 
admission, upon repeated questioning of officer and 
emergency room physician, that he swallowed six to 
eight pieces of rock cocaine. 
Affirmed. 
[1] CRIMINAL LAW<S=> 412.1(2) 
110k412.1(2) 
Rescue doctrine exception to Miranda requirements 
applied to arrested suspect's admission, upon 
repeated questioning of officer and emergency room 
physician, that he swallowed six to eight pieces of 
rock cocaine; arresting officer had reasonable belief 
that suspect had consumed cocaine based upon 
seeing him place his hand to his mouth, subsequent 
recovery of cocaine dropped by suspect, and 
presence of white residue in suspect's mouth, officer 
knew cardiac arrest could result from cocaine 
overdose, and suspect was anxious and had elevated 
heart rate when received at hospital, putting him at 
risk for acute myocardial infarction and 
hemmorhagic stroke. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[1] CRIMINAL LAW<®=* 412.2(3) 
110k412.2(3) 
Rescue doctrine exception to Miranda requirements 
applied to arrested suspect's admission, upon 
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Page 1 
,633 
repeated questioning of officer and emergency room 
physician, that he swallowed six to eight pieces of 
rock cocaine; arresting officer had reasonable belief 
that suspect had consumed cocaine based upon 
seeing him place his hand to his mouth, subsequent 
recovery of cocaine dropped by suspect, and 
presence of white residue in suspect's mouth, officer 
knew cardiac arrest could result from cocaine 
overdose, and suspect was anxious and had elevated 
heart rate when received at hospital, putting him at 
risk for acute myocardial infarction and 
hemmorhagic stroke. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[2] CRIMINAL LAW<&=* 412.2(3) 
110k412.2(3) 
When it is arrestee's life that is in jeopardy, rather 
than life of victim, officer, or member of public at 
large, police are nevertheless justified in asking 
questions directed toward providing life-saving 
medical treatment to arrestee without first 
administering Miranda warnings. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
**879 *1235 Brett Harding Duxbury, Glendale, 
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George 
Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 
Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, *1236 Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising 
Deputy Attorney General, and David Andrew 
Eldridge, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
BARON, Associate Justice. 
In this case we hold that the police may ask 
questions of an arrestee which are prompted by a 
concern that the arrestee's life is in danger as a 
result of a possible overdose of narcotics without 
first advising the arrestee of his Miranda rights. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 
Deputy Sheriff Richard Schlegel testified that he 
was on routine patrol in a high narcotics area of Los 
Angeles County on June 1, 1995, at about 12:30 
a.m., when he first observed appellant Jeffrey 
Andre Stevenson. Appellant also saw Deputy 
Schlegel and as the deputy approached appellant, 
appellant turned and walked rapidly away while, at 
the same time, placing something in his mouth. As 
» orig. U.S. govt, works 
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appellant lifted his hand to his mouth, Deputy 
Schlegel saw a rock of cocaine drop to the ground. 
Deputy Schlegel arrested appellant, recovered the 
cocaine, looked in appellant's mouth and observed a 
white residue in appellant's mouth. It looked to the 
deputy as if appellant had chewed up cocaine. 
Concerned about a possible overdose, Deputy 
Schlegel immediately transported appellant to a local 
hospital where he was treated by emergency room 
physician Dr. Brian Harris. In Dr. Harris's 
opinion, appellant was at risk of acute myocardial 
infarction and hemorrhagic stroke. Appellant 
became combative when the doctor attempted to 
pump his stomach. Both Deputy Schlegel and Dr. 
Harris repeatedly asked appellant if he had ingested 
narcotics. Appellant continually denied ingesting 
any controlled substances but eventually, after being 
informed of the risk of coronary artery disease and 
myocardial infarction, appellant reluctantly admitted 
he had swallowed six to eight pieces of rock 
cocaine. As a result, Dr. Harris again attempted to 
pump appellant's stomach, but aborted the procedure 
when appellant vomited macerated fragments of 
what could have been cocaine and seemed in no 
further danger of an overdose. 
Appellant and his friends, Lavell Austin and 
Anthony Breland, testified appellant had just left a 
liquor store when he was arrested by Deputy 
Schlegel for no apparent reason; they did not see 
appellant with any cocaine and the officer did not 
fmd any after searching the area. Appellant denied 
possessing or ingesting cocaine or anything else 
prior to his arrest. He *1237 denied that Deputy 
Schlegel took him to the hospital immediately. They 
stopped at the police station for five to ten minutes 
on the way. He also denied telling Deputy Schlegel 
or Dr. Harris that he swallowed cocaine. Appellant 
admitted he bad been convicted of selling cocaine in 
1988 and commercial burglary in 1992; since then 
he has not used, possessed or sold cocaine and has 
worked as an in- home nurse. 
The jury convicted appellant of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation of Health and 
Safety Code section 11350. In a court trial, the 
1988 sale of a controlled substance conviction was 
found true by the court. (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd. 
(b); Heath & Saf.Code, § 11370, subds. (a) and 
(c).) Appellant was sentenced to state prison for 
four years, granted presentence credit of 180 days, 
and ordered to pay a restitution fine of $1,000 
pursuant to Government Code section 13967, 
subdivision (a). This appeal followed. 
••880 DISCUSSION 
I. 
The Suppression Motion 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to suppress evidence of his admission that 
he had swallowed six to eight pieces of cocaine 
because he had not been advised of his Miranda 
rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 
436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) 
before Deputy Schlegel and Dr. Harris questioned 
him at the hospital. Appellant recognizes that the 
"public safety" and "rescue" exceptions to Miranda 
hold that "[w]hile life hangs in the balance, there is 
no room to require admonitions concerning the right 
to counsel and to remain silent." (People v. Dean 
(1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 875, 882, 114 Cal.Rptr. 
555.) However, appellant argues the emergency 
doctrine only applies when the life of a victim, an 
officer, or the public-at-iarge is at risk. Appellant 
reasons thatM 'the need for answers to questions in a 
situation posing a threat to the public safety 
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule 
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against 
self-incrimination* " (New York v. Quarles (1984) 
467 U.S. 649, 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2632, 81 
L.Ed.2d 550) but, "the need for answers to 
questions in a situation posing a threat to a 
defendant's own safety does not." Thus, according 
to appellant, "[wjhere the police believe that a 
defendant's own safety is threatened, they should not 
be permitted to decide for defendant whether that 
possible threat justifies an incursion upon his own 
privilege against self-incrimination; the defendant 
can ... make that decision for himself after being 
properly Mirandized." We find this argument 
untenable. 
•1238 "[Tlbe two basics of the Miranda opinion 
relevant here are (1) its assumption that the purpose 
of custodial interrogation is to further criminal 
prosecution, and (2) its public policy to outlaw 
police misconduct relating to the third degree. 
Neither point is central to the question of police 
conduct in emergencies, where the primary objective 
of police action is to save human life." (People v. 
Riddle (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 563, 574, 148 
Cal.Rptr. 170.) 
Copr. O West 1997 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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The scope and elements of what constitutes a valid 
instance of exigent circumstances were well defined 
in the Riddle case. There, the wife of a burglary 
victim was missing. The police took the burglary 
suspect into custody and initially asked him 
questions about the whereabouts of the missing 
woman without first advising him of his Miranda 
rights. This was held not to be error. Riddle 
determined that when the possibility of saving the 
life of a missing victim exists, noncoercive questions 
may be asked of a suspect in custody, even though 
the answers to the questions may incriminate the 
suspect. In reaching this decision, the court relied in 
part on the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 
S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, which stated: " 
' "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid 
serious injury is justification for what would 
otherwise be illegal absent exigency or emergency." 
' [Citation.]" (83 Cal.App.3d at p. 572, 148 
Cal.Rptr. 170.) The Riddle court then set forth 
requirements which it deemed sufficient to excuse 
noncompliance with Miranda: "1. Urgency of need 
in that no other course of action promises relief; flU 
2. The possibility of saving human life by rescuing a 
person whose life is in danger; ffl] 3. Rescue as the 
primary purpose and motive of the interrogators." 
(Id. at p. 576, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170.) 
The court in People v. McDermand (1984) 162 
Cal.App.3d 770, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773, applied the 
Riddle rescue doctrine in a situation where it was a 
noncustodial murder suspect whose life was in 
danger. The suspect had repeatedly stressed in 
letters to the sheriff's department and to the press 
his intent "not to be taken alive." In order to induce 
the suspect to surrender, the police made false 
promises and representations to the suspect that they 
wanted to help not punish him which resulted in a 
telephone call from the suspect in which he 
confessed to the murder of his mother and brother. 
(Id. at p. 794, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773.) In holding the 
suspect's confession admissible, McDermand 
pointed out that " 'an interrogation concerning 
"rescue" might ordinarily have the dual purpose of 
both rescue and incrimination, but **881 so long as 
the developed facts show the motive behind the 
interrogation to be primarily that of rescue, the 
interrogation is justifiable despite an apparent 
Miranda violation.' [Citation.]" (162 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 797, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773, quoting People v. 
Willis (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 433, 449, 163 
Cal.Rptr. 718.) 
[1] In our view, this case also falls within the 
purview of the rescue doctrine and we are satisfied 
that all three Riddle requirements are present. The 
•1239 deputy had a reasonable belief that appellant 
had consumed cocaine based upon seeing appellant 
place his hand to his mouth, the recovery of the rock 
of cocaine which dropped from appellant's hand as 
his hand went to his mouth, and the white residue in 
his mouth. Deputy Schlegel had learned at the 
sheriff's academy that cardiac arrest and death can 
result from a cocaine overdose. Unsure of the 
quantity of cocaine and concerned that appellant had 
taken an overdose, the deputy questioned appellant 
about the amount of cocaine he had ingested. 
Appellant denied consuming cocaine, but the deputy 
thought otherwise. Deputy Schlegel testified that he 
felt he had an " obligation and responsibility" to 
make sure that appellant was treated if appellant 
had, in fact, consumed any narcotics. Thus, for 
medical reasons, the deputy did not want to book 
appellant and place him in custody at the station. 
Instead, he took appellant to the hospital. 
At the hospital, Deputy Schlegel informed Dr. 
Harris that he believed appellant had consumed 
cocaine. Dr. Harris testified that when appellant 
was received at the hospital, his heart rate was very 
elevated, he was anxious, very diaphoretic, 
sweating, and appeared to be emotional. In the 
doctor's opinion, appellant's elevated heart rate and 
other aspects of the physical exam put him at risk 
for acute myocardial infarction and hemorrhagic 
stroke. The doctor had seen cardiovascular disease 
and death and hemorrhagic stroke with people who 
had ingested small amounts of cocaine. However, 
other substances also cause a patient to exhibit 
appellant's symptoms. The doctor attempted to 
initiate a number of diagnostic modalities to 
determine which substance appellant ingested, 
including gastric lavage or pumping his stomach 
which requires placing an oral gastric tube into his 
stomach to remove the substances so they could be 
sent to the lab for analysis. But appellant became 
combative and would not allow any of the 
procedures. Thus, the doctor could only rely on 
"history." Accordingly, both the doctor and the 
officer inquired many times of appellant if he had 
ingested any controlled substances that evening. 
Finally, after explaining to appellant the risk of 
coronary artery disease and myocardial infarction, 
Copr. © West 1997 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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appellant reluctantly said he had swallowed some 
rocks of cocaine. 
[2] On the facts we have outlined, we see no 
rational reason to exclude appellant from the reaches 
of the rescue doctrine. When a life is in danger, the 
law should make no distinctions. Accordingly, 
when it is the arrestee's life which is in jeopardy, 
the police are equally justified in asking questions 
directed toward providing life-saving medical 
treatment to the arrestee without first warning the 
arrestee that his answers can be used against him in 
a court of law. The Miranda advisement was meant 
to protect an accused from the loss of his right to 
silence not from the loss of his life. The doctrinal 
underpinnings of Miranda do not require us to 
exclude appellant's •1240 statement, thus penalizing 
the deputy for asking the very questions which were 
the most crucial to the effort to provide appellant 
with medical treatment. (Cf. New York v. Quarles, 
supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 657- 658, 104 S.Ct. at pp. 
2632-2633.) 
II.-V. [FN**] 
FN** See footnote *, ante. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
CHARLES S. VOGEL, P.J., and HASTINGS, J., 
concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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